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The Four Rivers lottery run by the National Forest Service dis-
tributes the opportunity to raft four sections of rivers in Idaho through
a non-transferable lottery. The restriciton of trade and focus on equity
in distribution creates a deadweight loss in total surplus compared with
a market or auction system. If the NFS allowed the transfering of per-
mits, then there exists a potential for rafters to gain surplus in trade.
However, non-rafters have an incentive to enter the transferable lottery
to make a pro￿t from trade. Using the NFS lottery as a guide, this pa-
per examines welfare under the two lottery system to understand how
changes in transferability a￿ect the welfare of users and non-users,
and the revenues of the government. Since variables, such as number
of permits, permit fees, and application fees, also impact welfare, we
derive comparative statics for these variables to demonstrate how these
government controls a￿ect rafter welfare, non-rafter welfare, and gov-
ernment revenue di￿erently under transferable and non-transferable
lotteries. Our results show the welfare trade-o￿s rafters have between
transferable and non-transferable lotteries.1 Introduction
In 2003, the National Forest Service (NFS) had 205 million visitors
to forest and grassland areas (NFS 2004). As the number of outdoor
enthusiasts and recreationers increases so does damage to the environment.
Conservation through limiting the number of visitors becomes a priority in
order to minimize damage and overuse.
There exist several mechanisms to distribute resource access.
Auctions distribute limited goods to the highest bidder, queues to those
willing to wait the longest, and merit or preference programs to those most
deserving of the good. Lotteries provide an allocation mechanism which
allows everyone an equal chance at resource access regardless of age,
experience, merit, or income. Examples of a lottery distribution include
hunting permits, river rafting permits, and hiking permits.
The Four Rivers Lottery run by the NFS demonstrates an example
of conservation and restriction of resource access through a lottery. The
Selway, Snake-Hell’s Canyon, the Middle Salmon, and Main Fork of the
Salmon have become four popular rivers in the rafting community for
multiday ￿oat trips. Known for their scenic views and fast waters, each of
these sections of rivers wander through federally protected wilderness areas,
set aside for conservation of wildlife. The government controls access to the
river to protect the beaches and waterways from overuse and exploitation.
Only about 60 trips a season raft down the Selway without costly damage
to the area. For the Salmon, Middle Fork, and Snake sections, only about
300 to 400 trips travel downstream per season.
The people who value the resource the most may or may not obtain
a permit. Loomis (1982) evaluates the pricing system against the lottery
system to demonstrate the total bene￿ts of each, and the loss of bene￿ts
1from using a lottery. In a pricing market, those willing to pay the most get
the good, while lotteries may allocate goods to consumers with a marginal
willingness to pay (WTP) lower than the market value of the good. This
creates a deadweight loss and ine￿ciency in allocation of resources in terms
of total welfare. Loomis (1980) ￿nds that deadweight causes a bene￿ts loss
of 43% because of the focus on equity rather than optimization.
Although the government uses a lottery to distribute permits for
equity purposes, the agency further restricts the permit holder by requiring
the winner to be present at the launch site on the issue date of the permit.
In other words, the permit holder cannot use the permit on another day nor
can he resell the permit to another rafter who might value the river trip
more. Because of this restriction, the permits and therefore resource access
are de￿ned as non-transferable. This restriction keeps outside speculators
from entering the lottery and reselling permits for a pro￿t. However, rafters
do have some bene￿t to having transferable permits. They can gain surplus
through trade, and those with the highest value for the rafting experience
end up with the permits.
Some papers have looked at the bene￿ts of secondary markets and
trading permits. Eichberger, Guth, and Muller (2003) compare, both
theoretically and experimentally, the attitudes toward risk in a repeated
lottery with and without the option to sell the good after the lottery has
been won. Their subjects show little risk aversion, but put a high value on
the option to sell in the second decision stage. Weitzman (1974) looks at
welfare gains from trading permits, and examines the bene￿ts of using
prices or quantities to control pollution. Given this trade-o￿ between the
two methods, he suggests that a mixed strategy may optimize welfare in
some cases. Sandrey, Buccola, and Brown (1983) examine the market for
2elk hunting permits in order to recommend better pricing policy strategies.
They demonstrate the negative e￿ects for hunters with a relatively low
WTP. Boyce (1994) develops a model to compare auctions to transferable
and non-transferable lotteries. He shows that rebate o￿ers, which come
from an auction or lottery proceeds, cause some participants to prefer a
transferable lottery or auction over a non-transferable lottery.
Although previous research has shown the trade-o￿ between
transerability and non-transferability, these studies did not consider the
additional impact of changes to the lottery system. Variables such as
application fee, permit fee and number of available permits also impact
welfare, the demand for permits, the user and non-user surplus, and
government revenue. Increases in permit fees can cause applicants to drop
out, while increases in the number of permits can increase demand, but
cause damage to the environment.
Several studies have examined the impacts of policy changes on
welfare. Nickerson (1990) measures how regulation in the management of
big game hunting a￿ects the amount of lottery applications. Creel and
Loomis (1992) examine the demand for hunting when a policy on bag limits
constrain the possible amount of hunting. They develop an econometric
model that accounts for this bag limit and compare it against models that
do not. Scrogin (2005) developed an individual model and empirically
tested it using data from the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish
for quota hunts on public lands for deer, elk , antelope, bighorn sheep, wild
pig, bison, ibex, and oryx. He showed that changes in quality and quantity,
due to policy adjustments, can a￿ect an individual’s WTP both adversely
and favorably. Buschena, Anderson, and Leonard (2001) examine a lottery
system where applicants compete by accumulating preference points.
3Because of this unique allocation system, their study estimates the impact
of di￿erent hunt characteristics on the value of permits. Scrogin, Berrens,
and Bohara (2000) examine the e￿ects of a change in a lottery program
designed to increase participation, such as reduced participation fees and
increased permit availability. They measure consumer welfare using the
Marshallian surplus and a proposed measure which accounts for the
probability of winning the lottery. Both measures show a signi￿cant
increase in consumer welfare with the policy changes.
This paper compares transferable and non-transferable lotteries,
and analyzes the impact on welfare from changes in the lottery system. We
develop a measures for rafter and non-rafter welfare, similar to the measure
used by Scrogin, Berrens, and Bohara (2000). We then compare welfare
under transferability and non-transferability, and include an examination of
government revenue, which previous research has not analyzed. The model
of welfare demonstrates conditions for when users, non-users, and the
government prefer a transferable lottery to a non-transferable lottery.
Speci￿cally, it shows the welfare trade-o￿s that rafters have between the
two systems. Furthermore, we add to previous research by examining
changes in control variables, such as application and permit fees, and the
number of permits, to study how they a￿ect welfare and revenue with and
without the transfer restriction.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the four rivers
lottery system. The model developed in section 3 measures rafter surplus
and government revenue for a lottery when permits are non-transferable.
Section 4 measures rafter and non-rafter surplus, and government revenue
when the lottery allows permit transfers. Section 5 compares welfare under
transferability and non-transferability to see when preferences change.
4Additionally, we analyze comparative statics caused by changes in fees and
permit availability. Finally, section 6 discusses the implications from these
results and further possible research.
2 Overview of the Four Rivers Lottery
Although the requirement of trip permits exists year round on the
Snake, Middle Fork, and Main Salmon, lottery permits control tra￿c
during parts of the year with higher demand. For the Selway, lottery
permits restrict access during May 15th to July 31st. The Snake and
Middle Fork of the Salmon enforce lottery permits from late May through
the middle of September. Finally, the Main Salmon requires lottery permits
from June 20th through the middle of Septemeber. From this point further,
we refer to lottery permits as simply permits.
In order to boat any one of the four rivers, rafters must apply to
the same lottery, making the Four Rivers Lottery unique. Each year the
application process starts December 1st, and ends January 31st. Applicants
choose their top four picks of launch dates, and what river they prefer to
boat for each launch date. For example, one rafter may choose June 1-4 as
his top four choices for the Middle Fork. Popular dates and river
combinations decrease the odds of winning, and an applicant may prefer to
increase his odds of winning by choosing di￿erent rivers, such as June 1 or
2 for the Middle Fork and July 16 or 17 for the Main Salmon. Each river
and launch date provides a di￿erent experience for rafters. Early season
trips have high, fast ￿owing water that provides challenging and
adventurous whitewater. However, other rafters prefer a more relaxing ￿oat
with milder rapids and warm water provided by the late season. Each
applicant states his preferences for rivers and dates, and if drawn, obtains a
permit based on preferences and availability.
5Table 1. Number of applications submitted, permit allocated, and
percentage of winning for each river in 2006.
River Section Submitted Allocated %
Main Salmon 3418 310 9.07
Middle Fork 10627 387 3.64
Snake 1058 324 30.62
Selway 1728 62 3.59
Total 16831 1083 6.43
Source: National Forest Service
http://www.fs.fed.us/r4/sc/recreation/4rivers/stats.pdf (accessed April 19,
2007).
The lottery administration randomly selects winners and matches
their choices with available permits. In the event that all choices of the
selected winner have been ￿lled, the lottery draws another winner. This
selection process repeats until all permits have been distributed. The
probability of winning a permit and the number of applicants for each
section shows the di￿erences in demand for each river. For instance,
winning a permit on the Snake usually has the odds of 1 in 3, while winning
a Middle Fork permit has odds around 1 in 27. Table 1 shows the summary
statistics for the Four Rivers Lottery for the 2006 season. Allocated permits
are considerably lower than the number of submitted applications. While
each river has unique features, this table demonstrates that regardless, the
number of available permits far exceeds the number of rafters who
positively value them and submit applications.
The application process includes a non-refundable $6 fee, which
covers the government’s cost of administering the lottery. Furthermore, the
Middle Fork and Main Salmon sections require a permit or boating use fee
to boat on the waters for each person. The total cost of this fee varies on
the group size of boaters. Having an annual National Parks pass also
reduces the total cost of the boating fee. This money helps maintain
facilities, and protect natural resources (NFS). The application fee and the
6boating fee generate the total cost to boating, not including personal and
trip expenses.
The management plans for each river operate di￿erently regarding
cancellations, open dates, and waiting lists. However, there exists a
no-show penalty or cost to rafters not present on launch dates. For the
Selway and Snake, a one-year ban from the lottery penalizes rafters, while
the Middle Fork and Main Salmon have a three year penalty. Park rangers
verify that all rafting groups putting in at the launch site have a permit.
To model welfare, we consider three major agents; government,
rafters, and non-rafters. The government determines the method of
allocation for the permits, the number of permits, and the fees charged.
Based on several di￿erent criteria, such as conservation of habitat,
availability of beaches, and water ￿ow, the government determines the
optimal number of permits to allocate. Permits allow a person the right to
raft the river. The rafters gain or lose surplus based on how the government
allocates and charges fees for the permits. Non-rafters seek to exploit any
possible rents with a high WTP by reselling the permit they win to a rafter.
The following section explains the model for rafter welfare and
government revenue mathematically and graphically for the case of
non-transferable permits. Building this initial case allows us to later extend
the model to the transferable case and compare welfare comparative statics
under both scenarios. From the two scenarios, we study the trade-o￿s of
welfare that rafters face under di￿erent lottery systems.
3 Rafter Welfare and Government Revenue
Measures under Non￿transferable Permits
The current lottery system run by the NFS does not allow for the
transfer of permits. This restriction creates welfare ine￿ciency, since those
7who value the rafting experience the most do not necessarily obtain a
permit. However, disallowing transferring and trading of permits prevents
outside speculators from entering the market. With a secondary market
allowed, non-rafters have an incentive to apply for a permit with the
intention of reselling to a rafter for a pro￿t. An increase to the number of
non-rafters entering the lottery, decreases a rafter’s chance at winning as
well as his expected surplus. By making the permits non-transferable, the
government and rafters e￿ectively deter the non-rafter’s pro￿t seeking
behavior, but lose welfare by not being able to trade. To examine this
trade-o￿, this section examines a model to analyze rafter welfare and
government revenue under a lottery with permit transfers prohibited. In
this scenario, rafters cannot sell or trade their permits to other rafters for a
more preferred date.
In order to develop an estimate of welfare for the rafters, we begin
by examining the rafter’s value for permits, or in other words the rafter’s
value for the experience of a trip down the river. We de￿ne a rafter as any
person willing to pay a positive price to obtain the right to raft one of the
wild rivers. Let vi(q) determine the value of a permit for consumer i minus
travel costs or the net value of a ￿oat trip, where q represents the number
of permits used. Since each consumer knows he can only have one permit,
the market demand for permits, v(q), in a way, orders the rafters by their
WTP for one permit. Ranking the rafters from highest to lowest by their
WTP gives the downward sloping aggregate demand curve, v(q). We
assume the aggregate demand of the permits has the linear functional form:
v(q) = α − β · q − γ · ¯ q (1)
8where q notates the quantity demanded, α, β > 0 are constants, and ¯ q
represents the number of permits. As the number of people on the river
increases with the number of permits, the value of the river experience
decreases and this is captured by the constant γ > 0 as a congestion
parameter.
Given the uncertainty with a lottery, the probability of winning
a￿ects the expected value of the permit as well as rafter welfare. The
expected value of a permit resembles the value except that the lottery
creates uncertainty in obtaining the permit. In order to account for this
uncertainty, expected value takes into consideration the probability of
winning, which depends on ¯ q and the number of applicants, qn. Then the
probability of winning in the non-transferable lottery is notated as δnt =
¯ q
qn.
The expected aggregate value of the permit equals the probability of
winning multiplied by the value of the permit and written as:
δnt · v(q) = δnt · (α − β · q − γ · ¯ q) (2)
The cost of the application fee and uncertain permit fee a￿ect the
expected cost as well as rafter welfare. Let fa denote the application fee
and fp notate the permit fee. The total cost to raft equals fa + fp. For
simpli￿cation, we assume that the government always sets the application
and permit fees such that market value exceeds total cost,
α − β · ¯ q − γ · ¯ q > fa + fp. With this assumption the lottery adds
uncertainty, and the expected cost becomes fa + δnt · fp. This setup implies
that number of applicants, qn, becomes a function of government controlled
variables, ¯ q, fp, and fa.
qn = g (¯ q,fp,fa) (3)
9Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium number of rafters in a
non-transferable lottery. Again, the aggregate value of permits orders all of
the rafters by the WTP from highest to lowest, which generates the
downward slope of v(q). Because of the uncertainty of obtaining a permit
caused by the lottery, the expected aggregate value of permits takes into
consideration the probability of winning which ranges between 0 and 1.
Thus, the expected bene￿ts from entering the lottery δnt · v(q), must lie
below v(q). The expected cost, fa + δnt · fp, for the rafter includes the
application fee, fa, and the chance of paying the permit fee, fp. The
government determines the appropriate ¯ q, that maintains the wilderness of
the environment. Because so many people place a high value on rafting in
the wilderness areas, the number of permits is set less than the number of
applicants, ¯ q < qn.
The marginal rafter has a cost equal to his expected value, δnt ·v(q).
Ordering the rafters by their WTP shows that rafters who apply have a
WTP higher than the marginal rafter. Rafters with a WTP lower than the
marginal rafter decline to enter the market. Thus, equating expected cost
10with expected value gives a solution for the number of applicants.
δnt · (α − β · q − γ · ¯ q) = fa + δnt · fp (4)
Since δnt =
¯ q
qn, we derive equation (5), the number of applicants, in terms of
the number of permits, permit fee, application fee, and parameters α, β, γ
from equation (4).
qn =
¯ q · (α − γ · ¯ q − fp)
β · ¯ q + fa
(5)
If every rafter obtained a permit, the maximum surplus possible
would equal the area in ￿gure 1 under v(q) between 0 and qn. Since the
lottery randomly determines which applicants receive permits, we must
calculate an expectation of rafter surplus rather than the actual total rafter
surplus.
Measuring expected rafter surplus in the non-transferable lottery
allows us to compare welfare in the transferable lottery. After the
calculation of welfare, we can then determine how government control
variables a￿ect welfare under both scenarios. This comparison allows us to
see the trade-o￿ that rafters have between the two allocation mechanisms.
3.1 Welfare measures with non-transferable permits.
In this section, we calculate rafter welfare along with government
revenue in the non-transferable lottery. To determine the expected rafter
surplus before the drawing has taken place, expected surplus must take into
consideration the probability of winning. In order to award applicants, the
NFS contracts out the lottery assignment task to a statistical company, who
randomly generates the winners. We assume that the lottery distributes
permits randomly by using a uniform distribution for the probability of
winning a permit, meaning each rafter has the same probability of winning.
11To measure expected rafter surplus (RS), we begin by calculating
an individual’s expected surplus, and then aggregate over all individuals.
The expected value to rafter i is calculated from the expected value of
winning minus the expected costs for the individual, and written as
E (vi|¯ q,fa,fp) = δnt · vi(q) − (fa + δnt · fp) (6)
Figure 2 modi￿es ￿gure 1 by including the area of expected surplus
for rafters. The aggregation of individual surplus, equation (6), equals the
area under the expected value curve, δnt ·v(q), between 0 and the number of
applicants, qn, minus the expected cost from the application and permit fees
for each applicant. This rafter surplus estimate measures lottery-allocated
welfare in a manner similar to the model developed by Scrogin, Berrens,
and Bohara (2000), which takes into consideration the uncertainty of
obtaining a permit. Area Y and Z in the above ￿gure represent this
measure of welfare. Plugging in the value curve, equation (1), the number
of applicants, equation (5), probability, and integrating, we write RS in








v(q)dq − qn · (fa + δnt · fp)
= ¯ q ·
"
γ¯ q · fa + (β¯ q · (α − fp))
2 · (fa + β · ¯ q)
#
(7)
While the government agency determines the allocation method,
their objectives can have many dimensions. These include covering the cost
of operation, equity in allocation, and river conservation. Although their
objectives a￿ect the mechanism used, we only examine revenues generated
from the lottery.
The total revenue to the government agency comes from two
sources: the application fees, and the permit fees. Revenue from the
applications comes from everyone entering the lottery, while the revenue
from permits only come from the ¯ q winners. Thus, the government revenue
(GR) can be written in terms of the controlled variables.
GRnt = (qn · fa) + (fp · ¯ q)
= ¯ q ·
 
fp +
fa (α − γ · ¯ q − fp)
fa + β · ¯ q
!
(8)
The number of permits, ¯ q, application fee, fa, and permit fee, fp
a￿ect the amount of welfare rafters and the government receives in the
non-transferable case. From equation (8) and equation (10), we can derive
comparative statics, which allow us to examine the impacts on welfare
caused by changes in these control variables. These results can then be
compared to the transferable case in order to understand the trade-o￿s
between the two scenarios.
3.2 E￿ect of Government Controls on Welfare under
non-transferability
13The NFS can a￿ect the total welfare by changing ¯ q, fa, and fp,
thereby changing rafter surplus and government revenue. As expected, RS
decreases for increases in fa and fp. For any fee increase, expected cost
increases fa + δnt · fp, decreasing the surplus for an individual. Although an
increased fee causes the number of applicants to decrease and a higher





β¯ q2 · (α − fp − γ¯ q)
2(fa + β¯ q)





2(fa + β¯ q)
< 0 (10)
A positive increase in fa or fp causes an increase the government
revenue in a non-transferable lottery. These results appear consistent with
expectations, because increases in fees decrease the number of applicants
but increase the probability of winning. As that probability increases,





β¯ q2 (α − γ¯ q − fp)
(fa + β¯ q)
2 > 0 (11)
∂GRnt
∂fp




(fa + β¯ q)
!
> 0 (12)
When the number of available permits increase, an increase in RS




(β¯ q · (α − fp) − γ¯ q · fa)
(fa + β¯ q)
2 > 0
then RS will also increase. Expected value, δnt · v(q), and the expected
cost, fa + δnt · fp, shifts upwards and more applicants enter the lottery until
expected value equals expected cost again. However, the expected value
14and expected cost functions do not shift proportionally, because cost
includes the certainty of having to pay an application fee. Thus, expected
value increases more, relative to the increase in expected cost, causing an
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An increase in the number of permits, ¯ q, also has an uncertain
a￿ect on government revenue. If changes in ¯ q causes the probability of
winning to increase more applicants enter, but an increase in ¯ q decreases
the value of the permits through congestion, γ. These counteracting forces
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These comparative statics can then be compared with welfare
measures and comparative statics under a transferable lottery. This
analysis provides insight into the welfare trade-o￿s between the transferable
and non-transferable lottery.
4 Rafter Welfare and Government Revenue
Measures under Transferable Permits
Rafters have an incentive to keep non-rafters from entering a lottery
for permits, because non-rafters decrease the probability of winning and the
amount of potential welfare. However, in a transferable lottery, rafters gain
surplus from trading as well as welfare e￿ciency. To see this trade-o￿,
consider now the lottery scenario with transferable permits. The
distribution of permits remains the same as before, but with transferable
permits, rafters who win can trade the permit for a more preferred launch
date, or they can sell the permit to another rafter who has a higher WTP.
15The ability to sell the permits also provides non-rafters with an incentive to
enter the lottery for the purposes of resale. This section examines what
happens to rafter welfare, non-rafter welfare, and government revenues if
permits were made tradable.
Since non-rafters now have an incentive to enter the lottery, we
de￿ne non-rafters as any person willing to enter the rafting market without
any intention of rafting. They intend to gain rents from the lottery
allocation and ability to transfer permits. The non-rafter resells his permit
to a rafter with a high WTP and, hopefully, pro￿ts from it. Furthermore,
rafters with a low WTP would rather resell their permits than raft, because
their surplus is greater from selling than from rafting. They in essence
become non-rafters due their low WTP and the ability to trade permits.
Figure 3 remains similar to the previous graphs, but now the
probability of winning in the transferable lottery, δt = ¯ q/(qnr + qr), takes
into consideration that both rafters, qr, and non-rafters, qnr, enter the
market, or the total number of applicants, Q = qnr + qr. In the
non-transferable scenario, the value for permits and the value for rafting
16were interchangeable. However, under transferability, the rafters’ value for
permits may change, but his value for rafting stays the same. For
simpli￿cation we consider only, the value of rafting as v(q).
Since ¯ q represents the number of permits, v(¯ q) represents the value
of rafting for the ¯ qth rafter. The resell price of a permit, denoted ¯ v,
becomes reasonable for rafters, non-rafters, buyers, and sellers. The ￿rst ¯ q
number of rafters in order of WTP, who did not win a permit from the
lottery, purchase permits at a price of ¯ v. Any price higher would cause an
excess supply. Rafters with a low WTP (vi(q) < ¯ v), or non-rafters who win,
sell their permits for ¯ v because anything lower will cause excess demand.
Now consider the non-rafter who enters the lottery. He does so only
if his expected value from entering the lottery and being able to resell the
permit exceeds his expected cost. Thus, the marginal non-rafter equates
expected value of resale equal to the expected cost.
δt · (α − β¯ q − γ¯ q) = fa + δt · fp (15)
Plugging δt into equation (15) and rewriting we solve for the total number






(α − β¯ q − γ¯ q − fp) (16)
The rafters continue to enter the market until expected costs equal
the expected bene￿ts but now the probability of winning includes the
non-rafters.
δt · (α − βq
r − γ¯ q) = fa + δt · fp (17)
Plugging in Q, the number of rafters simpli￿es to the number of available
permits. Clearly, only increases in the number of permits cause increases to
17the number of rafters under transferability. This result makes logical sense.
Only the ￿rst ¯ q rafters, with a WTP greater than the ¯ qth rafter, actually
raft.
q
r = ¯ q (18)
A rafter with a WTP lower than the ¯ qth rafter sells his permit
making him a non-rafter. Plugging (17) into the total number of applicants
(16), we can ￿nd the number of non-rafters in the lottery.
q
nr =
¯ q (α − β¯ q − γ¯ q − fa − fp)
fa
(19)
Determining the number of rafters qr, and non-rafters, qnr, allows us to
derive rafter welfare, non-rafter welfare, and government revenue in the
transferable lottery.
4.1 Welfare Measures under a Transferable Lottery
Allocation
Calculating welfare under a transferable lottery allows for a
comparison between the di￿erent lottery scenarios. When the lottery allows
permit transfers, non-rafters may enter the lottery with hopes of gaining
rents through resale. Rafters gain surplus by being able to trade, but also
lose surplus through an increase in the number of applicants caused by
non-rafter. Thus, rafter surplus (RS) depends on whether the winner of the
lottery is a rafter or non-rafter.
Figure 4 shows the total applicant welfare gained from a
transferable lottery by both rafters and non-rafters. Total applicant welfare
equals the area under the value curve(v(q)) from 0 to ¯ q minus the cost to
the government for application and permit fees for each permit or areas A
and B. Since the ¯ q rafters with the highest WTP obtain the permits either
through winning or trade, rafters gain a share of B by winning, and
18additionally gain area A through trade because they never pay a price
greater than ¯ v.
Equation (20) calculates the area A, below the value curve minus
the resale value.
A = ¯ q ·
(α − ¯ v)
2
=
¯ q (β¯ q + γ¯ q)
2
(20)
Equation (21) calculates the area B as the area between the resale value
minus the total cost of the permits.
B = ¯ q · (α − β¯ q − γ¯ q − fa − fp) (21)
We assume that the proportion of rafters applying equals the
proportion that wins, which follows from the uniformity assumption of
winning. Thus,
qr
(qnr+qr) represents the share of rafter winners. Plugging in
the values for qr and qnr gives RSt in a transferable lottery, which equals
19area A plus the rafter share of area B.







¯ q + fa
(α − β¯ q − γ¯ q − fa − fp)
(α − β¯ q − γ¯ q − fp)
#
(22)
Even though non-rafters win a share of permits, they can gain
surplus through exchange with rafters who have a high WTP. Again, we
assume that the proportion of non-rafters applying equals the proportion
that wins, and
qnr
(qnr+qr) represents the share of non-rafter winners. Thus, the
non-rafter proportion of area B represents the non-rafter surplus (NRS).
Plugging in the values for qr and qnr, gives NRSt under a tranferable
lottery in terms of the control variables.
NRSt =
qnr
qnr + qr · ¯ q (α − β¯ q − γ¯ q − fa − fp)
=
¯ q · (α − β¯ q − γ¯ q − fa − fp)
2
(α − β¯ q − γ¯ q − fp)
(23)
Again, note that the ability to trade gives rafters with a low WTP,
ie v(¯ q) < ¯ v, an incentive to sell and permit the win and no incentive to
purchase a permit. Thus, these rafters become non-rafters in this model.
"True non-rafters", who have no intention of rafting under any market
conditions, may also enter the lottery. In this model, non-rafter surplus
(NRS) includes the surplus of both low WTP rafters, who trade away their
permits, and "true non-rafters".
The total revenue to the government agency comes from two
sources: the permit fees, and the application fees. Both rafters and
non-rafters pay the fee for the application, while the revenue from permits
only come from the ¯ q winners. Thus, the government revenue (GR) written
in terms of the controlled variables this becomes equation (28).
GRt = (Q · fa) + (¯ q · fp)
20= ¯ q · (α − β¯ q − γ¯ q) (24)
All three government control variables a￿ect RSt and NRSt, while
only changes in the number of permits a￿ect government revenue. These
measures allow us to examine how changes in the control variables impact
welfare and revenue.
4.2 Impacts of Government Controls on Welfare under
Transferability.
Since ¯ v = α − β¯ q − γ¯ q, represents the price paid for the permit in
the secondary market, and fa + fp equals the total cost of the permit, then
the "pro￿t" or bene￿t from resale to the winning non-rafter is denoted
π = α − β¯ q − γ¯ q − (fa + fp). Using this notation, allows us to simplify the
comparative statics results for the transferable lottery.
Changes in the application fee have an uncertain impact on RS. If
the bene￿t from resale π > fa, then the RSt increases. This relationship
exists because some non-rafter will drop out of the lottery and increase the
probability of winning for the rafters. When π < fa, non-rafters do not
enter the lottery, and thus, any increase in the application fee when π < fa
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An increase in the permit fee decrease the number of non-rafters
entering the market, which increases rafter share of area B. However, area
B diminishes with an increase in the permit fee. This causes RSt to




−¯ q · f2
a
(α − β¯ q − γ¯ q − fp)
2 < 0 (26)
21Increases in application and permit fees negatively impact
non-rafter surplus, as shown by equations (27) and (28). Since cost to the
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Equations (29) and (30) shows that the e￿ect of changes in the
number of permits on RSt and NRSt. An increase in available permits
causes area A and B to grow, but the value of permits shifts in due to more
congestion, γ, on the river. Furthermore, an increase in ¯ q decreases the
resale price ¯ v, making it less pro￿table to trade. The impact on RSt
includes a surplus decrease caused by congestion, a surplus gain caused by
an increase in rafters, and a surplus gain caused by a lower ¯ v. Together,
these factors create a positive impact on RSt.
∂RSt
∂¯ q
= β¯ q + γ¯ q + fa −
f2









The impact on NRSt includes a loss in surplus caused by congestion, a gain
in surplus caused by more ¯ q, and a loss in surplus caused by a lower ¯ v.
Together, these factors create an uncertain impact on NRSt
∂NRSt
∂¯ q
= −β¯ q − γ¯ q − fa + π +
f2






22Interestingly, application and permit fees have no a￿ect on
government revenue in a transferable lottery. Thus, changes in fees only
a￿ect rafters and non-rafters. Furthermore, increasing available permits, ¯ q,
has a positive impact on GR only if marginal value, α − 2(β¯ q + γ¯ q) > 0.
These comparative statics show the e￿ects of government control
variables have on rafter surplus, non-rafter surplus, and government
revenue. These results compared with the restriction of non-transferability
shows how the two mechanisms di￿er, and where possible trade-o￿s exist.
5 Results
In a non-transferable lottery, rafters gain surplus by not allowing
non-rafters into the lottery. However, in the transferable lottery they gain
surplus by being able to trade. Comparing the welfare measures from the
two scenarios captures the preference tradeo￿ rafters have between a
non-transferable and a transferable lottery. Comparative statics from each
scenario show how the government control variables have di￿erent e￿ects on
this preference.
Examining NRS and GR under both scenarios shows that
non-rafters and the government will always prefer the transferable lottery
due to a greater amount of welfare. However, rafters experience both a gain
and loss in surplus by allowing trade. They lose surplus from an increase in
the number of applicants, ie non-rafters, but they gain surplus by being
able to trade. RS under non-transferability and transferability are
rewritten in equation (31) for non-transferability (NT) and equation (32)
for transferability (T).
NT = ¯ q ·
"
γ¯ q · fa + (β¯ q · (α − fp))
2 · (fa + β · ¯ q)
#
(31)







¯ q + fa
(α − β¯ q − γ¯ q − fa − fp)
(α − β¯ q − γ¯ q − fp)
#
(32)












β¯ q + fa
#
· π + π (33)
The left hand side of equation (33) represents the loss of surplus
caused by the increase in number of applicants, while the right hand side
represents the gain in surplus from allowing trade. When π = 0, then
NT = T, and rafters become indi￿erent between the two lottery
mechanisms.
Figure 5 also represents this trade-o￿ of surplus. The colored plain
represents RSnt under non-transferability and the black and white grid
reprsents RSt under transferability. Along the bottom axis, the application
and permit fees change. The parameters are held constant at ¯ q = 1,
α = 1000, β = 1, and γ = 1.
24Table 2. Comparative Statics of Rafter and Non-Rafter Welfare
and Government Revenue caused by Control Variables.
Rafter Non-Rafter Gov. Rev.
Control Non- Non- Non-
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The ￿gure shows that initially rafters prefer a non-transferable
lottery, but as fees increase, the cost keeps non-rafters from entering the
transferable lottery. Eventually, the fees become high enough that rafters
will prefer a transferable lottery because they gain surplus from trading. If
the fees continue to increase even further, then the cost will eventually
become greater than the resale price, ie fa + fp > ¯ v. When costs increase
greater than ¯ v, the number of applicants decreases to below the number of
permits, qn < ¯ q, making the lottery unnecessary.
Table 2 shows the results for changes in welfare caused by changes
in the controlled variables, fa, fp, and ¯ q. To see the trade-o￿ of welfare for
rafters, examine the e￿ects of changes in fa under the tranferable lottery.
An increase in fa decreases the surplus of non-rafters. Because of this
increased cost, their expected pro￿t diminishes and some non-rafters will
not apply. This increases the odds of winning for the rafters, and thereby
increasing their surplus. However, the increasing cost also decreases their
surplus. The counteracting forces cause the uncertain comparative static
and demonstrate the welfare trade-o￿s for rafters.
The welfare e￿ects from changes in ¯ q, also demonstrate the
changing perference of rafters. An increase in ¯ q has an uncertain impact on
25non-rafter surplus. However, in the transferable case, more permits means a
lower selling price, and greater rafter surplus gained from trading, ie area A
grow. If ¯ q is large enough to make trading the permits non-pro￿table for
non-rafters, the rafters will prefer the transferable lottery.
6 Conclusion
Analysis of the Four Rivers Lottery provides a comparison of the
welfare trade-o￿s between a transferable lottery and a non-transferable
lottery. The NFS uses the lottery to distribute resource access, but
disallows the transferring of permits among users. This restriction has the
bene￿ts of keeping non-rafters from applying, while the prohibition of trade
creates an ine￿cient market in terms of total welfare. The tradeo￿s
between transferability and non-transferability provides many rent-seeking
e￿orts by rafters and non-rafters alike to either maintain the status quo or
seek changes to the lottery system. This paper evaluates that tradeo￿ from
the viewpoint of rafters, non-rafters, and the government.
The model developed in this paper analyzes rafter and non-rafter
welfare, and government revenue under both a non-transferable and a
transferable lottery. The welfare measures from this model show that
non-rafters and the government will always prefer a transferable lottery.
However, depending on the fees and number of permits, rafters can prefer
either lottery. Rafter welfare is greater under a transferable lottery when
the bene￿ts from trade exceed the reduction in surplus caused by entering
non-rafters. Rafters prefer a non-transferable lottery only when low fees
cause the pro￿t from resale to be high. The high pro￿t creates an incentive
for non-rafters to enter the lottery, reducing rafter surplus. The
non-transferable restriction keeps them from seeking that pro￿t.
26This study also examines the e￿ects government control variables
have on welfare and revenue measures. Changes in government controlled
variables, such as permit fees, application fees, and the number of permits,
can change the rafter’s preference towards a transferable lottery. For a
non-transferable lottery, increases to application and permit fees negatively
a￿ect rafter surplus, while increases to the number of permits have an
uncertain a￿ect on rafter surplus. Under transferability, only increases to
permit fees negatively a￿ect rafter surplus, while an increase to the number
of permits positively a￿ects rafter surplus. Finally, changes to the
application fee have an uncertain e￿ect on rafter surplus under
transferability. The increased fee decreases rafter surplus, but also
decreases the number of non-rafters entering. This result demonstrates how
rafters face a trade-o￿ between between transferable and non-transferable
lotteries under changing control variables. Rafters only bene￿t from
transferability when the gains from trading exceed the loss to additional
non-rafters in the lottery.
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